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This paper extends Calvo’s (1983) time-dependent pricing model to incor-
porate state-dependent features in pricing, while preserving tractability. The
pricing scheme delivers a generalized New Keynesian Phillips curve with an
explicit role for the frequency of price revisions. The model’s novel feature
shows that inﬂation responds to movements of relative prices and to endoge-
nous ﬂuctuations in the average frequency of price adjustment. The model
offers, therefore, a microfounded rationale for systematic deviations in the
inﬂation-marginal cost relation predicted by the new Keynesian Phillips curve.
As a byproduct, the model determines endogenously the short-run slope of the
Phillips curve. Simulations predict weaker responses of output and stronger
responses of inﬂation to technology, preference and monetary shocks than
those of a close time-dependent model. (JEL E31)
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Calvo’s(1983)pricingmodelassumesthatnominalindividualprices arenot revised
in every period and that ﬁrms do not change prices synchronously. Instead, ﬁrms
revise prices when they receive a random signal with constant probability over time
and equal for all price-setters.
At the ﬁrm level Calvo’s pricing assumptions imply that price setters cannot
respond to large shocks in the economy between price revisions. This was ﬁrst
pointed out by Caplin and Leahy (1991). Further, Romer (1990) and Golosov and
Lucas (2003) pointed out that, at the aggregate level, the frequency of price revi-
sions is constant and thus it does not respond to the state of the economy. State-
dependent pricing models such as Caplin and Leahy (1991, 1997), Caplin and Spul-
ber (1987) or Dotsey, King and Wolman (1999) concentrate in relaxing the ﬁrst
aforementioned implication. In the light of Woodford (2003), this paper focuses on
the second.
Woodford (2003, Ch.3) criticizes the existing literature on state-dependent pric-
ing based on the argument that ﬁrms do not evaluatetheirpricing plans continously;
theymostlyreconsiderpricesataparticulardateoftheyearbecausetherearesignif-
icant costs in the information gathering process (Zbaraki et al. [2000]). In contrast,
state-dependent models as those mentioned above assume that ﬁrms evaluate their
pricing policy in every period and set a new pricing policy only if they ﬁnd it con-
venient. However, such assumption is less appealing if the main cost in the pricing
process is the cost of learning the state of the economy. As discussed in Blanchard
and Fisher (1989, p. 413), if the cost of new prices is only the cost of learning the
state of the economy, then the pricing rule must be time dependent.
On the other hand, it is appealing to think that even if ﬁrms set the date for pricerevisions in calendar time due to costs of monitoring the economy, once the date
for evaluation of prices arrives, ﬁrms should consider the state of the economy in
their new prices and in their planned future dates for evaluationof prices. Moreover
if ﬁrms have the ability to choose between more versus less frequent future price
evaluations, the aggregate frequency of price changes can vary with the state of the
economy.
This paper proposes a one-sector framework that incorporates state-dependent
ﬂuctuationsintheaveragefrequencyofpricerevisionsbycombiningtime-dependent
and state-dependent features in the ﬁrms’ pricing scheme. Following Calvo (1983),
the model assumes that ﬁrms change prices when they receive a random signal with
constant probability over time. However, different from time-dependent models,
ﬁrms are allowed to choose a higher (exogenously given) probability of price revi-
sions. Price-setters must pay a lump-sum cost to beneﬁt from faster price revisions.
As in Dotsey, King and Wolman (1999) this lump-sum cost is random. An en-
trepreneur speeds up the expected frequency of price changes if the cost of doing
so is compensated by the change in the value of the ﬁrm.
The proposed pricing scheme delivers a generalized New Keynesian Phillips
curve with an explicit role for the frequency of price revisions in the inﬂation-
outputrelation. In thePhillipscurveofthemodel, asintime-dependentmodelswith
two sectors with different degrees of nominal rigidities (Carlstrom, Fuerst and Ghi-
roni [2002]), current inﬂation responds to movements of relative prices. However,
different from time-dependent models, current inﬂation also reacts to endogenous
ﬂuctuations of the average frequency of price adjustments.
The new terms in the Phillips curve would look, to someone using the stan-
dard Calvo (1983) pricing model, like exogenous cost-push shocks disturbing the
relation between inﬂation and marginal cost. Here however, the additional terms
2are not exogenous but endogenous variables that respond systematically to exoge-
nous shocks. The model provides, therefore, a novel way to interpret what these
cost-push shocks might be.
As byproduct, the short-run slope of the Phillips curve in the space of current
inﬂation and marginal cost is endogenously determined by the steady state of the
economy. More ﬂexible prices—endogenously induced by lowering the random
lump-sum cost incurred to change prices more often—lead to a steeper Phillips
curve.
I use the model to study the dynamics of output, inﬂation, the interest rate and
the frequency of price changes in the presence of exogenous shocks. The responses
of output to technology shocks, preference shocks, and shocks to the Taylor rule
are weaker than those predicted by a closely related time-dependent model. On the
other hand, responses of inﬂation are stronger. Simulations also show that inﬂation
and the frequency of price changes move in the same direction after preference
and monetary shocks, and in opposite directions after technology shocks. This is
due to procyclical movements of the frequency of price changes that are inherited
from procyclicality of proﬁts around a steady-state with zero inﬂation. This result
is in line with the common wisdom that the frequency of price changes is positive
correlated with the inﬂation rate, evidence which is in Cecchetti (1986).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the dynamic,
stochastic, general equilibrium model. Section 3 presents the log-linear version of
the model and discusses the new features of the Phillips curve. Section 4 calibrates
the model and presents impulse responses. Section 5 concludes.
3II. The model
The economy is populated by a representative household, a continuum of monopo-
listic ﬁrms indexed by z ∈ [0,1], a monetary authority, and a ﬁscal authority.
A. The household
The household’s period utility function at t is
U(Ct,Mt/Pt,Nt) ≡
ϕd,t












where Γ ≥ 0, γ > 0, κ > 0, ι > 0, and ζ ≥ 0. Ct ≡





with θ > 1, is the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator of consumption over varieties of goods
ct (z). Mt denotes nominal cash balances, Pt is the price index and Nt is time
allocated to labor, with the total endowment of time per period normalized to one.
ϕd,t is a preference shock that follows a stationary stochastic process.
The budget constraint is
Mt−1 + At + Bt−1 + Wt Nt + ∆t ≥
  1
0
pt(z)ct(z)dz + Bt/(1 + rt) + Mt.
The sources of funds are nominal cash balances left available in period t−1, Mt−1,
nominaltransfers At receivedfrom themonetary authority,nominalbondsmaturing
at period t, Bt−1, income from working a fraction Nt of the endowed time at a
nominalwagerate Wt, and lump-sumtransfers equal to thenominalproﬁts from the
monopolistic ﬁrms, denoted by ∆t
1. The uses of funds consist of consumption of
the good ct(z) purchased at the nominal price pt(z) for z ∈ [0,1], bonds purchased
1Later it will becomeclear that this transferscome from two sources. After tax proﬁts fromﬁrms
and government revenues from taxes on proﬁts. Thus the total transfer equals to the before-taxes-
proﬁts, that is ∆t =
  1
0 ∆t(z)dz, where ∆t(z) denotes before-taxes-proﬁtsof ﬁrm z.
4at t with nominal value of Bt/(1 + rt ), where rt is the net nominal interest rate
between t and t + 1, and the money balances Mt carried into t + 1.
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is the utility-based price index.
Let χt denote the Lagrange multiplier associated to the budget constraint, the























d,t (1 − Nt)
−ζ = χtwt,
5and
(6) χt = βEt
χt+1 [1 + rt]
Πt+1
,
where Πt ≡ Pt/Pt−1 is the gross inﬂation rate, and wt ≡ Wt/Pt is the real wage.
B. The Firms
In every period t = 0, 1, 2, ..., each ﬁrm produces a distinct perishable good in-
dexed with the same index of the producing ﬁrm.
The pricing scheme
Extending Calvo’s (1983) pricing, I assume that the continuum of ﬁrms is formed
by two sets of monopolistic ﬁrms, L ≡ {z |z ∈ [0, µ]} and H ≡ {z |z ∈ (µ, 1]}.
The ﬁrms in set L revise prices with probability (1 − αL) in each period, while
the ﬁrms in set H revise prices with probability (1 − αH) in every period, with
(1 − αH) > (1 − αL).
Once a ﬁrm z in L receives the random signal of price revisions, following
Dotsey,KingandWolman(1999), italsoobservestherealizationofarandomlump-
sum cost ξ ≥ 0 with cumulativedensity function G(·). Different from Dotsey, King
and Wolman (1999), ξ measures the random cost, in units of output, that the ﬁrm
has to pay in order to increase its probability of price revisions from (1 − αL) to
(1 − αH).2 If the ﬁrm does not pay the random cost, it is subject to the lower
probability of price revisions, but it can set a new price without cost. Note that as
in Calvo’s pricing, I assume that the physical cost of changing prices is zero.
2In Dotsey, King and Wolman (1999),ﬁrms evaluate in every period if it is convenient to change
prices or keep the same price, giventhe physicalcost of changingprices which they assume random.
6A ﬁrm z ∈ L that pays the random cost at t will be subject to a probability of
price revisions (1 − αH) until it receives a new random signal, say at t + i. Then,
the monopolistic ﬁrm will choose at t + i either to pay the random cost again and
keep the higher probability of price revisions, or not to pay the random cost and set
its probability of price adjustment equal to (1 − αL). Note that ﬁrms in the set H
have no incentive to choose a lower probability of price revisions because they can
adjust prices with a higher probability without incurring the random cost.
Value of the ﬁrm
To save notation, deﬁne the subindex j ∈ {H, L}. The value of z at t can be de-
scribed using four recursions, two of them associated to its value at t, D0j,t, given
that z is setting a new price subjet to the probability(1 − αj). The other two recur-
sions are associated to the value of z at t + i, D1j,t+i, with i = 1,2,3..., subject to
(1−αj), given that z has not changed its price since t. The four recursions account
for the possibility of acting under two different probabilities of price revisions and
the two possibilities of being allowed to change prices or not. These recursions are
described in what follows.
a) z ∈ L
Consider ﬁrst the maximization problem for a ﬁrm z ∈ L receiving the random
signal to revise prices at t. The ﬁrm decides a new price and its probability of price
revisions. The decision is based on the value of the ﬁrm under each probability of
price adjustment.
Let It+1(1) be the indicator function equal to 1 if z ∈ L chooses (1 − αH)
and zero otherwise. Let λt+1 ≡ Pr[It+1(1) = 1] be the probability of z choosing
(1 − αH) at t + 1. Also let d(pj,t(z),·) be the real proﬁts at t for the ﬁrm z, given
7the price pj,t(z). Moreover, assume that proﬁts are levied at a tax rate τj ≥ 0 for
ﬁrms acting under the probability of price revisions (1 − αj).
Note that he model allows for, but does not require, differentiated tax rates. As
argued below, for the case of an economy with zero steady-state inﬂation, it will be
useful to introduce a tax on the proﬁts of ﬁrms acting under (1−αL). In particular,
I will assume τL > 0 and τH = 0. This will be the the only role for the ﬁscal policy
in the model.
The real value at t of the ﬁrm z ∈ L acting subject to the probability (1 − αj)
that receives the random signal of price revision, gross of the random cost, is given
by the recursion
D0j,t (St) = max
pj,t(z)
 
(1 − τj)d(pj,t(z), St)
+ β αj Et
χt+1
χt
D1j,t+1 (pj,t(z ), St+1)
+ β (1 − αj) Et
χt+1
χt
λt+1 [D0H,t+1 (St+1) − Ξt+1]
+β (1 − αj) Et
χt+1
χt




where St is a vector of variables describing the state of the economy at t, β
χt+1
χt is
the stochastic discount factor, and Et Ξt+1, deﬁned below, is the expected random
cost conditional on choosing (1 − αH) at t + 1 with probability λt+1.
The recursion (7) has a straightforward interpretation. For example, set j =
H. Then, it follows from (7) that the value of the ﬁrm z ∈ L at t acting subject
to (1 − αH), D0H,t(·), equals the after-tax-proﬁts (1 − τH)d(pj,t(z),·) plus the
discounted expected value of the ﬁrm at t + 1. The last three lines in (7) describe
the expected value of the ﬁrm at t + 1 under the three possible circumstances.
First, with probability αH the ﬁrm is not allowed to change its price. Thus it is
8not allowed to choose a different probability of price adjustment. In that case, the
value of the ﬁrm at t + 1 is D1H,t+1(·).
Second, with probability (1 − αH) the ﬁrm receives the random signal of price
revision—which is strictly time dependent—and, with expected probability Et(1−
αH)λt+1, the ﬁrm decides to pay the random cost with conditional expected value
EtΞt+1. In that case, the expected value of the ﬁrm is Et[D0H,t+1 − Ξt+1].
Finally with probability (1 − αH) the ﬁrm is allowed to revise its price, and
with expected probability Et(1−λt+1) the ﬁrm decides not to pay the random cost.
Therefore it will be subject to the probability of price changes (1 − αL). In that
case, the expected value of the ﬁrm is EtD0L,t+1(·).
Following the same principle, the value of the ﬁrm at t + i, for i = 1,2,3,...,
acting under (1 − αj), if it does not receive the signal of price revisions since t, is
D1j,t+i (St+i) = (1 − τj)d(pj,t(z), St+i)




+ β (1 − αj) Et
χt+1+i
χt+i
λt+1+i [D0H,t+1+i (St+1+i) − Ξt+1+i]
+ β (1 − αj) Et
χt+1+i
χt+i
(1 − λt+1+i) D0L,t+1+i (St+1+i) .
(8)
Note that the maximization operator is not present in (8) because the ﬁrm cannot
revise prices; the only decision made is input demand, which is implicit in the
deﬁnition of d(·).
b) z ∈ H
Now consider the value of a ﬁrm z ∈ H receiving the random signal to change
prices at t. Since the ﬁrms in H can change prices with high probability without
9incurring the random cost, they choose (1 − αH) with probability one.
The value of z ∈ H is
D0H,t (St) = max
pH,t(z)
 
(1 − τH)d(pH,t (z), St)













D1H,t+i (St+i) = (1 − τH)d(pH,t(z), St+i)










for i = 1,2,3,.... The interpretation of the recursions (9) and (10) is similar to
those described above.
Probability of switching from low to high expected frequency of price changes
A ﬁrm z ∈ L receiving the random signal of price revisions at t chooses the high
probability of price revisions if and only if the value of the ﬁrm at t under (1−αH)
exceeds the value of the ﬁrm at t under (1 − αL) by at least the lump-sum random
cost associated, that is, if and only if
(11) D0H,t − D0L,t ≥ ξ .
Before observing the realization of ξ, the probability of z choosing (1 − αH) is
Pr[D0H,t − D0L,t ≥ ξ] = G(D0H,t − D0L,t).
10As argued by Dotsey, King and Wolman (1999), the continuity of G(·) and
the fact that there is la large number of ﬁrms imply that the fraction of ﬁrms that
chooses (1 − αH), conditional on receiving the random signal of price revisions,
is λt = G(D0H,t − D0L,t). Moreover, letting g(·) denote the density function
of ξ, the conditional expected random cost at t is Ξt ≡ 1/G(D0H,t − D0L,t) ·
  [D0H,t−D0L,t]
0 xg(x)dx.




b · exp(−b · ξ); ξ ≥ 0
0; ξ < 0
.3
Thus, the probability of z choosing (1 − αH) and the conditional expected random
cost of doing so are, respectively:4













Firm z acting under (1−αj) maximizes its expected present value by choosing the
price pj,t(z) charged at t subject to the pricing schemedescribed above, thedemand
3Different from Dotsey, King and Wolman (1999) or Burstein (2002), I do not need to impose
an upper bound for the random variable ξ. This is because ﬁrms have the option of not paying the
random cost and still change prices with a lower frequency.
4Note that the expected random cost is conditional on ξ satisfying [D0H,t − D0L,t] ≥ ξ ≥ 0.
Otherwise, according to (11), the ﬁrm chooses not to pay the random cost. To obtain equation
(13) compute 1/G(D0H,t − D0L,t) ·
  [D0H,t−D0L,t]
0 xg(x)dx, forward the resulting expression
one period and take the expected value. Note that the term 1/λt+1 in (13) is part of the conditional
distribution, i.e., g(ξ|ξ < ξ0) = g(ξ)/G(ξ0).
11for the good z, and the technology
(14) yt (z) = ϕT,t Nt (z),
where yt(z) is the total output produced by the ﬁrm, Nt (z) is the amount of labor
employed by the ﬁrm z, and ϕT,t is a productivity shock that follows a stationary
stochastic process. yt(z) has two components: output produced to satisfy consumer
demand yc,t(z) and output required in pricing activities by ﬁrms incurring the ran-
dom lump-sum cost, yp,t(z), i.e., yt(z) ≡ yc,t(z) + yp,t(z).
Constant returns to scale imply that the total cost of production required to meet
consumer demand can be written as ψtyc,t(z), where ψt is the real marginal cost
implied by optimal input demand5. This, together with the market clearing condi-
tion ct(z) = yc,t(z) and equation (1) yields the proﬁt function gross of the random
lump-sum cost as










According to (7), the ﬁrst-order condition for the optimal new price of ﬁrm
z ∈ L acting subject to (1 − αj) is






















5Marginal cost is not ﬁrm speciﬁc because labor is freely mobile and ϕT,t is common across
ﬁrms.
12for i = 1,2,3,....
For ﬁrm z ∈ H, equation (9) implies the ﬁrst-order condition





















for i = 1,2,3,....
Using (15) to obtain ∂d(·)/∂pj,t(z), substituting (17) into (16) recursively, and
substituting (19) into (18) recursively, the optimal new price set at t by any ﬁrm















where I dropped the ﬁrm-subindex z because the new price p∗
j,t is common for all
ﬁrms subject to the probability (1 − αj).
Dynamics of average frequency of price changes
Recall that ﬁrms z ∈ L can revise prices with probability (1−αL) without cost, but
a ﬁrm z ∈ L can choose the higher probability of price revisions (1−αH) if it pays
the random lump-sum cost ξ. Let Vt be the mass of ﬁrms z ∈ L that are subject to
the probability (1 − αH) at time t. The mass Vt accounts for all ﬁrms z ∈ L that
in their last price revision before and up to t chose (1 − αH) and have not revised
prices since then. Note that the mass of ﬁrms z ∈ L choosing (1−αH) at t is given
13by the difference Vt − Vt−1.
Let µt be the mass of ﬁrms acting subject to (1−αL) at t—recall that no z ∈ H
chooses (1−αL) in any period. Giventhe initialconditionsµ0 and V0, the dynamics
of Vt and µt can be described with the recursions
(21)
Vt = Vt−1 + λt(1 − αL)µt−1 − (1 − λt)(1 − αH)Vt−1 ,
µt = µ − Vt ,
µ0 = µ, and V0 = V .
The ﬁrst recursion in (21) implies that the net mass of ﬁrms z ∈ L choosing
(1−αH) at t, Vt−Vt−1, equalsthemassofﬁrms thatdecided toswitchfrom (1−αL)
to (1 − αH) at the beginning of the period, minus the mass of ﬁrms switching back
from (1−αH) to (1−αL). Thus, the second term in the ﬁrst equation states that, at
time t, a fraction λt of the mass receiving (at the beginning of t) the random signal
ofpricing-plan revisionswithlow probability,(1−αL)µt−1, will choose(1−αH)—
i.e. they will pay the random cost. The third term states that a fraction (1 − λt) of
z ∈ L under (1 − αH) decides not to pay the random cost and switches back to
(1 − αL), i.e., (1 − λt)(1 − αH)Vt−1 choose (1 − αL).
The second equation in (21) holds because the mass of ﬁrms in L, µ, is constant,
so that Vt + µt = µ for all t = 0, 1, 2.... The initial conditions are endogenously
determined by the steady state of the economy (see Appendix A).
Assuming that one period represents a quarter, it follows that, in average, ﬁrms
in the economy change prices
(22) Ft ≡ (1 − αL)µt + (1 − αH)(1 − µt)
times per quarter. Note that, although the expected frequency of price revisions
14can take only two values at ﬁrm level, the average frequency of price revisions at
the aggregate level is a double-bounded continuous function of µt, with upper and
lower bounds (1 − αH) and (1 − αL)µ + (1 − αH)(1 − µ), respectively.
The price level
To make explicit the effects of ﬁrms changing their probability of price revisions on
the price level, it is convenient to rewrite the price index (2), in terms of the price
sub-indexes PL,t and PH,t as follows
(23) Pt ≡





































With the proper selection of the index s ∈ [0,1], the integral in the sub-index
Pj,t aggregates prices of ﬁrms subject to the probability (1 − αj). Note that the
choice of the weight δt ∈ (0,1) does not affect the price index deﬁnition nor its
dynamics. If δt = µt, the price sub-indexes PL,t and PH,t are the consumer price
sub-index of the baskets of goods produced by the ﬁrms s ∈ [0, µt] and s ∈ (µt, 1],
respectively. However, it is convenient to deﬁne the sub-indexes Pj,t with δt equal
to the steady-state value of µt in order to make explicit the effect of the average
frequency of price changes in the Phillips curve. Thus, I assume δt = µ in what
follows.
15Recursions for price sub-indexes
As in the standard Calvo (1983)-Yun (1996) setup, the dynamics of the price sub-
indexes can be described using a simple recursion. Given that the probability of
not changing prices for each ﬁrm under (1 − αj) in every period is equal to αj, the
price subindex Pj,t will contain a fraction αj of the prices prevailing in the previous
period. Moreover, since all ﬁrms setting a new price at t under (1−αj) will choose
the same price p∗
j,t, we can express the price sub-indexes at t as
(24) P
(1−θ)


























In (24), the mass of ﬁrms setting the new price p∗
L,t is expressed as the mass
of ﬁrms that had the opportunity to revise prices at the beginning of the period t,
(1 − αL)µt−1, minus the net mass of those that decided to choose (1 − αH) at
t, (Vt − Vt−1). Similarly, in (25), the mass of ﬁrms setting the new price p∗
H,t is
expressed as the mass of ﬁrms under the high probability that received the random
signal of price changes at the beginning of the period, (1−αH)(1−µt−1), plus the
net mass of ﬁrms z ∈ L choosing (1 − αH) at t, (Vt − Vt−1). Equations (23)-(25)
describe the evolution of the price index.
Finally, to close the model, we must specify the monetary policy. I do this
in the log-linear version of the model, which facilitates the study of its dynamic
properties.
16III. Log-linearized Economy
I analyze the dynamics of the model in its log-linear version. I denote by   xt ≡
dxt/x the percentage (logarithmic) deviation of the variable xt from its steady-
state value, which is written without the time subscript.
The steady state around which the analysis is centered assumes zero steady-
state inﬂation and is calibrated to have a constant mass of ﬁrms z ∈ L under (1 −
αH), thus, given an exogenous shock, the average frequency of price revisions can
increase or decrease. However, in a zero steady-state inﬂation economy there is no
natural incentive inducing ﬁrms z ∈ L to pay the random cost and choose (1 −
αH). Hence, it is convenient to introduce differentiated tax rates that generate such
incentive. As mentioned before, I assume τL > 0 and τH = 0.6 Moreover, I assume
that tax revenues are rebated to consumers in a lump-sum fashion.
Monetary Policy
To close the model, assume that the central bank follows a modiﬁed Taylor (1993)
rule
(26)   rt = σr  rt−1 + σπ  Πt−1 + σy  Yc,t−1 + εr,t .
where σr ≥ 0, σπ > 0 and σy ≥ 0 are parameters chosen by the central bank.
In particular, σr > 0 implies that the central bank adjusts gradually the nominal
interest rate in response to ﬂuctuations in inﬂation and output. εr,t is an i.i.d. shock
with standard deviation Φr.
6We can show that in the presence of positive steady-state inﬂation, the incentive for a steady-
state fraction of z ∈ L to choose (1−αH) arises naturallyand is increasing in the steady-state value
of inﬂation. Moreover, constant tax rates on proﬁts do not affect either the ﬁrm’s pricing decisions
or the dynamics of the economy in other form than the indicated.
17A Generalized Phillips Curve
The Phillips curve of the model is obtained from equations (20)-(25). As shown in
AppendixB, deﬁning theratio ofprice sub-indexes(24) and (25) as Tt ≡ PL,t/PH,t,
the model yields the Phillips curve
  Πt = βEt   Πt+1 + [µaL + (1 − µ)aH]   ψt
+ µ(1 − µ)(aH − aL)  Tt −
1
θ − 1
F [f − β]   Ft ,
(27)
where all the coefﬁcients are positive, with aL ≡ (1 − αL)(1 − βαL)/αL, aH ≡




L )/(αL − αH).
Equation (27) generalizes the New Keynesian Phillips curve in the sense that it
makes explicit the role of ﬂuctuations in the average frequency of price changes.
In (27), as in the textbook version of Calvo’s (1983) model, inﬂation is forward
looking and responds to ﬂuctuations in marginal cost. Moreover, in the Phillips
curve (27), as in Carlstrom, Fuerst, and Ghironi (2002), the ratio of price sub-
indexes affects current inﬂation.7 Appendix C shows that Tt is governed by the
second-order difference equation
βEt  Tt+1−τ1   Tt +   Tt−1 =







β  Vt+1 − τ2µ(1 − µ)  Vt +   Vt−1
 
(28)









7Carlstrom, Fuerst, and Ghironi (2002) investigate the determinacy properties of a two-sector
model with different degrees of nominal rigidity. In Carlstrom, Fuerst, and Ghironi (2002) Tt rep-
resents the ratio of price sub-indexes for the corresponding sub-baskets. Here, as mentioned above,
Tt does not represent the ratio of price sub-indexes, since the weights in the price sub-indexes are
ﬁxed (µ, 1 − µ), while the mass of ﬁrms forming the sub-baskets is allowed to change (µt, 1 − µt).
18Finally, different from time-dependent models, endogenous frequency of price
adjustments affects the dynamics of current inﬂation in the Phillips curve in two
forms. First, the short-run slope of the Phillips curve—in the (Πt,ψt) space—is
endogenously determined by the steady-state mass µ, which also determines the
steady-state of the average frequency of price revisions in equation (22). Figure 1
shows that, by lowering the unconditional mean of the random cost (E[ξ] = 1/b),
we obtain higher values of the steady-state frequency of price adjustments, which
in turn are associated to steeper slopes of the Phillips curve in the (Πt,ψt) space.8
That is, more ﬂexible prices induced by lower adjustment costs lead to a steeper
Phillips curve.9
Second, from the price sub-indexes (24) and (25) it is clear that the dynamic
evolution of the mass of ﬁrms setting new prices at different intervals of time, play
a role in shaping the evolution of the price level.   Ft appears in the Phillips curve to
account for the evolution of such mass of ﬁrms, which—using (21) and (22)—can
be expressed in terms of the average frequency of price revisions.
Log-linear versions of the mass of ﬁrms accelerating price changes (21) and the
average frequency of price revisions (22) yield
(29)   Vt = v1  Vt−1 + v2   λt ,
8Sheshinski and Weiss (1993) show that an inverse relation between the cost of price adjustment
and the frequency of price adjustment holds in a state-dependent deterministic model. Golosov and
Lucas (2003) ﬁnd such relation in a stochastic state-dependent model.
9Using Romer’s (1990)setup, Bakhshi, Burriel-Llombartand Khan (2002) analyze the short-run
slope of the Phillips curve in a model with positive steady-state inﬂation and (ad hoc) endogenous
price ﬂexibility. They ﬁnd a positive relation between steady-state inﬂation and the slope of the
Phillips curve.
19and




where v1 ≡ [1 − (1 − αL)λ − (1 − αH)(1 − λ)], thus v1 ∈ (0, 1)), and v2 ≡
λ[(1 − αH) + µ(1 − αL)/V ].
From (29) and (30), we can see that any shock perturbing   λt leads to persistent
changes in the frequency of price changes   Ft. The persistence of the frequency of
price changes—measured by v1—is a consequence of the time-dependent feature
of the model, i.e., because ﬁrms are not allowed to vary the probability of price
adjustments in every period.
Appendix C shows that log-linear versions of equations (7) and (8) together
with the deﬁnition of λt in (12) yield the following forward-looking equation for
the probability of choosing (1 − αH) as opposed to (1 − αL):
(31)   λt = βv1Et  λt+1 + (τL − τH)d  dt + v3Et (  χt+1 −   χt)
where v3 ≡ 1−λ
λ b[DH − DL − (τL − τH)d]. Log-linearizing the proﬁt function
(15), we get
(32)   dt =   Ct − (θ − 1)  ψt .
Equations(29)and(30)illustratethatthedrivingforcebehindﬂuctuationsinthe
frequency of price changes Ft is the probability of choosing faster price revisions,
λt. Equation (31) shows that such probability is determined by the string of current
and future proﬁt-differentials between ﬁrm setting prices under each probability,
(τL − τH)d  dt, and the effect of the discount factor. Hence, if the effect of proﬁt-
20differentials dominates in (31), we expect the frequency of price changes to co-
move with proﬁts.
The Rest of the Model
Households. Log-linearizing the Euler equation for consumption(3) and the Fisher
equation (6), we obtain




    Ct + νm
1−γ[γ − 1]  mt +   ϕd,t
and
(34)   χt = Et
 
  χt+1 +   rt −   Πt+1
 
,
where ν ≡ Γ[C1−γ + m1−γ]
−1. Using the approximation 1/(1 + rt) ≈ 1 − rt,
equations (4), (6) and (3) deliver the money demand




with unit elasticity in consumption and interest rate elasticity 1/γ.
Firms. The production technology (14) implies that in the aggregate Yt =
AϕT,t Nt, where Yt ≡ Yc,t + Yp,t, Yc,t ≡
  1





0 Nt(z)dz. Thus, the following condition holds
(36) Yc  Yc,t = Y
 
  Nt +   ϕT,t
 
− Yp  Yp,t
Since the real wage is not ﬁrm-speciﬁc, the real marginal cost is ψt = wt/ϕT,t.
21Accordingly,
(37)   ψt =   wt −   ϕT,t.
Log-linearizing equation (13) yields the log-linear version of the conditional
expected lump-sum cost as
(38)   Ξt =
1
Ξ
[DH − DL − Ξ]  λt .
The total output in pricing activities, Yp,t, is calculated by multiplying the con-
ditional average random cost (13) times the total mass of ﬁrms paying the random
cost, that is, Yp,t = λt [(1 − αH)Vt−1 + (1 − αL)µt−1]Ξt. Using   µt = −V/µ  Vt
from (21) we obtain
(39)   Yp,t =
ΞV λ
Yp
(αL − αH)  Vt−1 +   λt +   Ξt .






yc(z) = c(z), yields the following relation between the linear aggregator and the





Ct. That condition can be
approximated10 by
(40)   Yc,t ≈   Ct .
Appendix D shows the remaining set of equations used to account for the exact
equilibrium condition.
10The fact that (40) is a good approximation for the log-linear version of the (exact) market
clearing condition is also found by Dotsey, King and Wolman (1997).
22Combining (14) with the ﬁrst-order condition for labor supply (5), we obtain
equilibrium wage











  ϕT,t −   χt + ι  ϕd,t .
Exogenous shocks. To complete the description of the log-linear model we
must specify two exogenous processes. The productivity shock   ϕT,t and the prefer-
ence shock   ϕd,t follow autoregressive processes of order one:
(42)   ϕT,t = ρT   ϕT,t−1 + εT,t,
and
(43)   ϕd,t = ρd   ϕd,t−1 + εd,t ,
where 0 ≤ ρT < 1 and 0 ≤ ρd < 1. εT,t andεd,t are i.i.d. shocks with zero mean
and standard deviations ΦT and Φd, respectively.
IV. Calibration and Impulse Responses
Calibration
Equations (26)-(41) form a system of sixteen equations in sixteen endogenous vari-
ables:   Yc,t,   Πt,   rt,   Ft,   Vt,   Tt,   ψt,   Ct,   Nt,   wt,   λt,   Yp,t,   dt,   Ξt,   mt and   χt. The model
also includes three exogenous disturbances, a shock to the Taylor rule, a productiv-
ity shock (42) and a preference shock (43).
I use parameter values from the literature. The stylized fact of procyclical prof-
its is a key issue for calibration (Rotemberg and Woodford [1999] and Christiano,
23Eichenbaum and Evans [1996]). Although proﬁt variation plays no role in most
monetary models of the business cycle, in this model, ﬁrm’s decisions about speed-
ing up future changes in prices are based on the value of the ﬁrm, which in turn is
mainly determined by the string of current and expected future proﬁts. Thus, the
evolution of proﬁts directly inﬂuences the dynamics of the average frequency of
price revisions.
Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1996) discuss how the standard new Key-
nesian model requires a high value of the ﬁrm’s markup in order to produce pro-
cyclical movements in proﬁts. This property is inherited by our model. Here, I do
not attempt to ﬁnd a remedy, but I impose a high markup for the monopolisticﬁrms
and an inﬁnite elasticity of labor supply to generate procyclicality of proﬁts.11
I choose the parameters shaping preferences as follows. The discount factor
(β = 0.99) implies a rate of return of 4.1 percent annually. Γ = 1 corresponds to
a non-separable logarithmic utility in consumption and real money balances. From
(35), the inverse of γ is the interest rate elasticity of money demand. Thus 1/γ =
0.118 is in line with empirical estimates in Ireland (1997b). The price elasticity
of demand for the ﬁnal good in equation (1) implies a steady-state markup of 50
percent (θ = 3) above marginal cost. In steady-state, households allocate one third
of the endowed time to labor (N = 1/3) and their labor supply is inﬁnite-elastic
(ζ = 0). I set ι to 1/2, so the preference shock ϕd,t has qualitatively the same effect
on inﬂation and output as McCallum and Nelson’s (1997) IS shock. However, this
reduces the volatility of marginal cost in the presence of preference shocks.
The parameters of the pricing mechanism are chosen to stay close to the stan-
dard time-dependent model. (1 − αL) = 1/5 implies that ﬁrms under the low
11RotembergandWoodford(1999)proposesomeremediestoChristiano,EichenbaumandEvans’
critique.
24frequency of price changes revise prices once every ﬁve quarters on average; (1 −
αH) = 1/3 implies that, under the high frequency of price adjustments, ﬁrms set
new prices prices once every three quarters on average. The size of the set of ﬁrms
that endogenously choose their frequency of price changes is µ = 0.99. These val-
ues imply an upper and lower bound on ﬂuctuations of the average frequency of
price revisions of (1 − αH) = .333 and (1 − αL)µ + (1 − αH)(1 − µ) = 0.2133,
respectively.
Note that in the model, the probabilities of price adjustment (1 − αL) and (1 −
αH) represent two possibilities that one ﬁrm can adopt as part of its optimal pricing
policy. Values for the frequency of price chances in that range are common in
the literature. Note that this approach is different from the two-sector model with
differentdegreesofnominalrigidityofCarlstrom, Fuerst andGhironi(2002)orBils
and Klenow (2004) which capture intersectoral heterogeneity in nominal rigidities.
The parameter b in the distribution of the random cost G(·) is chosen so that
the unconditional mean of ξ is the same as in Dotsey, King an Wolman (1999), i.e.
E[ξ] = 1/b = 0.006. Golosov and Lucas’ (2003) calibration implies that the ran-
dom lump-sum cost of price revisions is about 1.9 percent of proﬁts. According to
our calibration, the (unconditional) expected cost represents 1.3 percent of proﬁts.
The values of differentiated tax rates on proﬁts, τL = 0.005 and τH = 0, allow
for the average frequency of price changes to increase by 17 percent or decrease by
23 percent with respect to its steady state (F = 0.28), without hitting the upper or
lower bounds.
The parameter values for the Taylor rule are in line with Ireland’s (2002) es-
timates for the post-1980 U. S. economy: σr = 0.5541, σπ = 0.5751, σy = 0.
Finally, I calibrate the exogenous shocks (42) and (43) as follows: ρT = .956,
ρd = .892, ΦT = .007, Φd = .035 and Φr = .0025.
25Parameter values are consistentwith a uniquerationale expectation equilibrium.
In particular, monetary policy responds to inﬂation aggressively enough to ensure
determinacy.
Impulse Responses
To analyze the effects of the new features of the model, I calculate the impulse re-
sponses for the three exogenous shocks—preference shock, technology shock and
shock to the Taylor rule—using the techniques described in Uhlig (1999). I com-
pare the results with a closely related time-dependent model. In this model, the
central bank follows the Taylor rule (26), households have the same preferences
and confront the same budget constraint as those described above, but ﬁrms follow
a pricing scheme as in Calvo (1983) with probability of changing prices (1 − α).




The ﬁrst-order condition for the representative household’s problem imply the
Euler equation (33), the Fisher equation (34) and the money demand (35). The
aggregate production of output is   Yc,t =   Nt +   ϕT,t and marginal cost is is given
by (37). Equilibrium in the goods market yields equation (40) and equilibrium




  Yc,t −   ϕT,t
 
−   χt + ι  ϕd,t. Finally, productivity and preference
shocks followthe processes (42)and (43), respectively. That forms a systemof nine
equations in nine endogenous variables (Yc,t, Πt, rt, ψt, Ct, wt, Nt, mt and χt) plus
three exogenous shocks (ϕT,t, ϕd,t and ϕr,t) and the corresponding assumptions.
The new parameter is α so that I set (1−α) = (1−αL). All other parameter values
are the same in both models.
Figure 2, shows the responses of interest rate, inﬂation, output and the average
frequency of price changes to a positive, one standard deviation preference shock.
Theresponseofinﬂationisstrongerin themodelofthispaper, whiletheresponseof
26output is weaker than those in the time-dependent benchmark. The same property
holds also for inﬂation and output responses to productivity shocks and shocks to
the Taylor rule, as shown in Figures 3 and 4. For monetary expansions this result is
found also by Dotsey, King and Wolman (1997).
Figures 2, 3, and 4 also show that for small shocks the dynamics of output and
inﬂationinthemodelwithelementsofstate-dependentpricingiswellapproximated
by the time-dependent model. That conclusion is also found by Dotsey, King and
Wolman (1997), Burstein (2002) or Klenow and Kryvtsov (2004).
Moreover, Figures 2, 3 and 4 show that the frequency of price changes is pro-
cyclical. This result follows from the procyclicality of proﬁts. Under zero steady-
stateinﬂation,thedifferenceinthevalueofﬁrmsadjustingpricesfasterversusthose
adjusting slower is proportional to proﬁts—common for both type of ﬁrms. Thus,
more ﬁrms are willing to cover the costs of additional price revisions in booms,
causing upward ﬂuctuations in the average frequency of price changes. Further-
more, procyclical movements in the average frequency of price revisions imply that
inﬂation and the average frequency of price changes move in the same direction
after preference shocks or shocks to the Taylor rule, but they move in opposite di-
rectionsaftertechnologyshocks. Thisresult isinlinewiththeconventionalwisdom
that the frequency of price changes is positive correlated with the inﬂation rate. For
example, such relation is assumed in Bakhshi, Burriel-Llombart and Khan (2002).
Moreover, evidence of that correlation is found by Cecchetti (1986) and suggested
in Zbaraki et al. (2000).
Figure 5 shows the evolution of the relative price Tt ≡ PL,t/PH,t. Figures 2 to 5
show that the impulse responses of the terms Tt and Ft in the Phillips curve (27) are
persistent. As menitioned in the introduction, those terms can be identiﬁed as cost-
push shocks by someone using the standard Calvo (1983) or Rotemberg (1982)
27pricing model. For example, Ireland (2004), using data for the U.S. economy in
the postwar period, ﬁnds evidence of systematic deviations in the inﬂation-output
relation predicted by a model with Rotemberg (1982) pricing. In Ireland’s (2004)
model the cost-push shock is characterized as exogenous stochastic disturbances
in the degree of monopolistic power that follow an autorregresive process of order
one. Consistently with the prediction of our model, Ireland ﬁnds that such shocks
are very persistent (with a correlation coefﬁcient of 0.9672) 12.
V. Conclusions
This paper introduced elements of state-dependent pricing in a tractable fashion in
a dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium monetary model. The pricing scheme
proposed represents a natural extension of Calvo’s (1983) pricing which generates
endogenous movements in the average frequency of price revisions. The incorpora-
tion of time-dependent and state-dependent features allows to the model to escape
Woodford’s (2003) critique of state-dependent models discussed in the introduction
and, by the same token, preserves the tractability of time-dependent models.
The pricing mechanism delivers a generalized New Keynesian Phillips curve in
the sense that it makes explicit the role of relative prices and the frequency price
revisions as additional endogenous variables that affect the inﬂation-output trade-
off. The model offers, therefore, a microfounded rationalefor systematicdeviations
in the inﬂation-output relation predicted by the new Keynesian Phillips curve, i.e.
cost-push shocks. Different from Steinnson (2003) or Ireland (2004), who micro-
found cost-push shocks as exogenous stochastic disturbances to the elasticity of
substitution between goods, here, such deviations arise endogenously.
12Moreover, Ireland (2004) ﬁnds that cost-push shocks are more relevant than technology shocks
in explaining the behavior of inﬂation, output and interest rates.
28The model predicts that exogenous shocks would have persistent effects in both
terms, relative prices and the frequency price revisions. This prediction is in line
with Ireland’s (2004) estimates who ﬁnds that, in the postwar period for the U.S.
economy, cost-push shocks are highly persistent.
Additionaly, I see this as a basic setup suited to tackle questions for which en-
dogenous price ﬂexibility is central in a dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium
framework. For example, we know since Ireland (1997) that we can explain the
empirical evidence on disinﬂationary programs implemented in high and moderate
inﬂation economies found by Gordon (1982) and Sargent (1982) by allowing for
endogenous speed of price adjustments. Moreover, Calvo, Celasun and Kumhof
(2003) show that the frequency of price adjustments (exogenously given in their
model) plays an important role in measuring welfare costs of disinﬂation programs.
This suggests that elements of state-dependent pricing are a desirable feature in
models of disinﬂation programs.
29Appendix A: The steady state


























using the last three equations we obtain the steady-state marginal cost:
















Note that equation (A-1) also holds in the Calvo (1983)–Yun (1996) setup.
Value of the ﬁrm, output, costs in pricing activities
From equations (7) and (8), note that D0j = D1j in steady state. Let Dj denote
the steady-state value of the ﬁrm under (1 − αj). Then, conditions (12) and (13) in
steady state become








− (1/b + DH − DL)exp(−b[DH − DL])
 
.
Next, from the proﬁt function (15), imposing the goods market clearing condition
C = Yc, steady-state proﬁts become d = 1
θYc. Using this and steady-state versions

















βλ(1 − αL)(1 − βαH)
Ω
Ξ,
where Ω ≡ (1 − β){1 − β [αH + λ(αL − αH)]}, ΩH ≡ (1 − βλαL) · (1 − τH) −
β(1−λ)·[(τL − τH) + αH(1 − τL)], and ΩL ≡ [1 − β(1 − λ)αH]·(1−τL)−βλ·
[αL(1 − τH) − (τL − τH)].13
I choose the parameter κ such that the steady-state labor effort is a convenient
level N (N = 1/3, see below), thus steady-state output is
(A-6) Yc + Yp = AN.
Output employed in pricing activities is calculated by multiplying the condi-
tional average random cost (in units of output) times the total mass of ﬁrms paying




β Ξ. Moreover, from (A-2) it follows that λ = 0, so that DH = DL = 1
1−βd.
31the random cost. Accordingly, in steady state:
(A-7)

















(1 − αH)(1 − λ) + λ(1 − αL)
.
Equations(A-2)–(A-8)constituteanonlinearsystemofsevenequationsinseven
variables: λ, DH, DL, Ξ, Yp, Yc, and V . Its solution yields the steady-state levels of
those variables.
Other variables
The ﬁrst-order conditions (3), (4) and (6) yield the steady-state real money balances
and Lagrange multiplier as:












respectively, where m ≡ M/P.





32I choose the value of κ (in the ﬁrst-order condition for labor supply, 5) so that
(A-12) κ(1 − N)
−ζ = χw,
is satisﬁed for N = 1/3.
Using µ = µ − V to ﬁnd the steady-state value of µ, the steady-state average
frequency of price revisions is given by equation (22)
(A-13) F = (1 − αL)µ + (1 − αH)(1 − µ).
Appendix B: Deriving The Phillips Curve
Log-linearizing the second equation in (21) we obtain
(B-1)   µt = −V/µ  Vt .
Log-linearizing the price index (23) yields
(B-2)   Pt = µ  PL,t + (1 − µ)  PH,t.
From (B-2), deﬁning Πj,t ≡
Pj,t
Pj,t−1,
(B-3)   Πt = µ  ΠL,t + (1 − µ)  ΠH,t.
The log-linear version of equation (20) can be written as
(B-4)   p
∗
j,t = (1 − βαj)(  Pt +   ψt) + Et βαj  p
∗
j,t+1.
33Using (B-1), the log-linear versions of equations (24) and (25) are






  Vt − αL  Vt−1
 
(B-5)






  Vt − αH   Vt−1
 
. (B-6)
Next, let Rj,t ≡
Pj,t
Pt and recall Tt ≡
PL,t
PH,t. Thus, from (B-2), we have
(B-7)   RL,t = (1 − µ)  Tt and   RH,t = −µ  Tt .
Forwarding (B-5) and solving for   p∗
L,t+1, I obtain
(1 − αL)  p
∗





(  Vt+1 − αL  Vt).
Substituting the last equation into the right-hand side of (B-4) for j = L, substitut-
ing the resulting equation into (B-5), and rearranging yields
  ΠL,t = βEt   ΠL,t+1 +
(1 − αL)(1 − βαL)
αL
 























Forwarding (B-6) and solving for   p∗
H,t+1, I obtain
(1 − αH)  p
∗





(  Vt+1 − αH   Vt).
Substituting the last equation into the right-hand side of (B-4) for j = H, substitut-
34ing the resulting equation into (B-6), and rearranging yields
  ΠH,t = βEt   ΠH,t+1 +
(1 − αH)(1 − βαH)
αH
 























Next, multiplying (B-8) times µ and (B-9) times (1−µ), substituting the result-
ing equations into (B-3) and using (B-7) yields
(B-10)
  Πt = βEt   Πt+1+[µ (1 − αL)(1 − βαL)/αL + (1 − µ) (1 − αH)(1 − βαH)/αH]   ψt












− β(αL − αH)
    Vt
Finally, using (30), and the deﬁnitions of aL, aH and f in the text, we obtain the
Phillips curve equation (27).
Appendix C: Difference equations for Tt and λt
The second-order difference equation for Tt, (28), is obtained as follows. Rewrite
(B-5) as
(C-1)
βEtRL,t+1 − [1 + β + (1 − αL)(1 − βαL)/αL]RL,t + RL,t−1 = Πt − βEtΠt+1

















  Vt − αL  Vt−1
 
.
35Similarly, rewrite (B-6) as
(C-2)
βEtRH,t+1−[1 + β + (1 − αH)(1 − βαH)/αH]RH,t+RH,t−1 = Πt−βEtΠt+1

















  Vt − αH   Vt−1
 
.
Use (B-7) to express (C-1) and (C-2) in terms of Tt, subtract (C-2) from (C-1),
collect common terms, and use the deﬁnitions of τ1, τ2 aH and aL in the text to
obtain (28).
To derive equation (31), log-linearize equation (12) to obtain





DH   DH,t − DL   DL,t
 
.
Using the result D0H = D1H in Appendix A, log-linearizing (7) and (8)—
evaluated at the optimum price—and comparing the resulting equations, note that
the value of the ﬁrm satisﬁes   D0j,t =   D1j,t. Thus, denote with   Dj,t the value of the
ﬁrm acting under (1 − αj). Equation (7) for j = H implies
DH   DH,t = (1 − τH)d   dt + [βαH + βλ(1 − αH )]DHEt   DH,t+1
+ β(1 − αH)(1 − λ)DLEt   DL,t+1 + [DH − (1 − τH)d]Et (  χt+1 −   χt)
(C-4)
and for j = L it implies
DL   DL,t = (1 − τL)d   dt + βλ(1 − αL )DHEt   DH,t+1
+ [β − βλ(1 − αL )]DLEt   DL,t+1 + [DL − (1 − τL)d]Et (  χt+1 −   χt).
(C-5)
36Subtract β(1 − αH)(1 − λ)DHEt   DH,t+1 from both sides of equation (C-4) to
obtain
DH   DH,t − β(1 − αH)(1 − λ)DHEt   DH,t+1 = (1 − τH)d   dt + [βαH + βλ(1 − αH )]DHEt   DH,t+1
+ β(1 − αH)(1 − λ)Et
 
DL   DL,t+1 − DH   DH,t+1
 
+ [DH − (1 − τH)d]Et (  χt+1 −   χt).
Use (C-3) in the last expression and simplify to ﬁnd





(1 − λ)(1 − αH)Et  λt+1
+ [DH − (1 − τH)d]Et (  χt+1 −   χt)
(C-6)
Subtract βλ(1−αL )DLEt   DL,t+1 from both sides of equation (C-5), use (C-3), and
simplify to obtain





λ(1 − αL)Et  λt+1
+ [DL − (1 − τL)d]Et (  χt+1 −   χt)
(C-7)
Next, subtract (C-7) from (C-6) and use (C-3) to obtain equation (31).
Appendix D: Aggregate goods market clearing
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Next, deﬁne the ratios of price indexes Rt ≡ Pt
 





PH,t. The log-linear versions of the conditions above are14:
(D-3)   Yc,t =   Ct − θ  Rt,
(D-4)   Rt = µ  RL,t + (1 − µ)  RH,t,
14To obtain (D-5) and (D-6), note that log-linearizing (D-1) and (D-2) we obtain:
  P L,t = αL







(  Vt − αL  Vt−1)
and






(  Vt − αH   Vt−1).
Next, subtract (B-5) and (B-6) from the equations above to obtain   RL,t and   RH,t.
38(D-5)   RL,t = αL






  Vt − αL  Vt−1
 
and
(D-6)   RH,t = αH






  Vt − αH   Vt−1
 
.
To calculate impulseresponses, I replace the approximation (40) in the text with
(D-3) and include equations (D-4) to (D-6).
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43Figure 1.
Slope of Phillips Curve in the (Πt,Ψt) Space
(varying the unconditional mean of the random cost E[ξ] = 1/b)





































































1Figure 2. Response to a Preference Shock
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Frequency of Price Changes    
−o − Model with State − Dependent Frequency of Price Changes, − × − Time − Dependent ModelFigure 3. Response to a Productivity Shock
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Frequency of Price Changes    
−o − Model with State − Dependent Frequency of Price Changes, − × − Time − Dependent ModelFigure 4. Response to a Expansionary Taylor Rule Shock
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Frequency of Price Changes    
−o − Model with State − Dependent Frequency of Price Changes, − × − Time − Dependent ModelFigure 5. Response of the Relative Price Tt and the Price Index Pt
Response of Tt to a Taylor Rule Shock Response of Tt to a Technology Shock Response of Tt to a Preference Shock
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–o–Model with State-Dependent Frequency of Price Changes,–×– Time-Dependent Model